ABSTRACT
Introduction
The relationship between corporate social responsibility (CSR) 1 and finance has received much attention from academics, the media and the business community for many years.
Much of the attention is centered on the relationship between CSR and corporate financial performance in general. Interestingly, there are mixed and often conflicting results in early studies (see the surveys by Orlitzky, Schmidt, and Rynes, 2003; Margolis, Elfenbein, and Walsh, 2009) , while recent studies tend to confirm a positive link between CSR and corporate financial performance (see Wang, Dou and Jie, 2015) . This lack of consistent results has prompted researchers to tackle the issue from a different perspective. In particular, finance scholars have started to explore the link between CSR and specific aspects of finance because CSR may not necessarily affect specific aspects of financial performance in the same way, resulting in different scenarios where overall corporate financial performance, as a net indicator of these effects, can be positively, negatively or not related to CSR.
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There are two main approaches of relating CSR to specific aspects of finance in the literature.
The first approach argues that CSR affects market valuations (Gregory, Whittaker, and Yan, 2011; Manescu, 2011 ) through channels such as future income/profitability, risk and expected return. By examining specific channel(s), one may understand how CSR enhances or worsens different aspects of corporate financial performance. This approach implicitly 1 CSR goes by many names and has several variants. We refer generally to CSR as the inclusion of environmental, social and governance concerns in corporate decision-making. This approach is also consistent with the Environmental, Social and Corporate Governance (ESG) framework of CSR on which our data on CSR are based. 2 Recently, there has been renewed interest in the literature focusing on specific dimensions of CSR (e.g., environmental, social or governance) and their separate relationships with corporate financial performance. This approach is sometimes called strategic CSR (see Baron, 2001; Porter and Kramer, 2006) .
assumes that capital market valuation is correct. To avoid this controversial assumption, the second approach aims to examine the possible link(s) between CSR and key finance decisions, such as investment (Manescu and Starica, 2007) , capital structure (Pijourlet, 2014) , mergers and acquisitions (Deng, Kang, and Low, 2013) and corporate cash holdings (Arouri and Pijourlet, 2015; Cheung, 2016) . This approach typically extracts information about key financial decisions from financial statements. However, very little work has been done on dividend policy; Rakotomavo (2012) is the only paper that touches on this issue. It examines a specific issue on the relationship between investment in CSR and expected dividend and finds that CSR investments do not take away from expected dividends.
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Following the second approach, the objective of this paper is to examine the relationship between CSR and dividend policy. To this end, we develop and empirically test two CSR views of dividends. The first view, called "the equity cost of the capital channel", posits that CSR-related activities lower the cost of equity through its risk premium (Ghoul, Guedhami, Kwok, and Mishra, 2011) , which would encourage firms to hold cash or invest instead of paying out cash dividends. According to Kim, Mauer, and Sherman (1998) , the incentive for firms to hold cash is higher (lower) when the cost of capital is lower (higher) because the opportunity cost of hoarding cash is lower (higher). Firms' incentive to invest can be higher (lower) too, since the external financial constraint is less (more) binding on firms when the cost of capital is low (higher). Therefore, firms may invest more and leave less room for paying dividends. This implies that CSR is negatively related to dividend payout. The second view, called "the earnings channel", argues that CSR-related activities can enhance earnings for various reasons such as better relationships with stakeholders, efficient management and so on (Heal, 2005) . Good relationships with stakeholders can reduce transaction costs (Jones, 1995) , enhance competitive advantage (Hillman and Keim, 2001; Choi and Wang, 2009 ) and reduce the cash flow shock when a negative event occurs (Godfrey, Merrill, and Hansen, 2009) . Therefore, firms with strong presence in CSR-related activities are expected to have higher output or income with a lower level of risk. The stronger earnings ability can result firms to be in a better position to pay and/or to pay more in dividends. The main results of this paper support the second view. We find evidence that firms with higher CSR scores tend to have a higher dividend payout ratio; however, we cannot find evidence that the decision to pay or not to pay dividends is determined by CSR scores.
This paper contributes to the literature in at least three ways. First, it fills an important gap in the literature on CSR and finance as little work has been done on the relationship between CSR and dividend policy. 4 Second, it examines the relationship between CSR and dividend policy in a comprehensive manner. In particular, we examine not only the dividend payout ratio (i.e., what dividends are paid?) but also the propensity to pay dividends (i.e., how likely is a firm to pay dividends?). The literature on dividend policy typically deals with the propensity to pay dividends and the dividend payout ratio separately. However, it is important to recognize that non-dividend paying firms choose to pay no dividends. As Heckman (1979) points out, as long as this decision is non-random, any analyses based on dividend-paying firms only may suffer from self-selection problem. The failure to account for the correlation between these two decisions is susceptible to inconsistent estimation. In fact, our evidence suggests that the propensity to pay dividends and the dividend payout ratio are, at least in our sample, not independent of each other. Third, we report empirical evidence that clearly clarifies the role of CSR in dividend policy. It is a driver of the dividend payout ratio but not a driver of the propensity to pay dividends.
Theoretical background and hypothesis
It is well documented that the market valuation effects of social norms are significant (Hong and Kacperczyk, 2009 ). The market valuation approach suggests that two forces are at work.
First, firms with better CSR are expected to improve their future cash flows (or profitability) (Manescu and Starica, 2007) , which can be distributed to shareholders. For example, firms may benefit by positioning themselves to take advantage of CSR-driven market opportunities (Porter and Kramer, 2006; Siegel and Vitaliano, 2007) and/or by incorporating all social costs or externalities and pricing goods and services accordingly (Heal, 2005; Johnston, 2010) . The second channel works through a reduction in the cost of capital, which is used to discount expected cash flows. For example, firms with better CSR are associated with lower (systematic) risk (Albuquerque, Durnev, and Koskinen, 2014) , the cost of debt/bank loans (Goss and Roberts, 2011; Menz, 2010) , the cost of equity (Ghoul, et al., 2011; Dhaliwal, Li, Tsang, and Yang, 2011) or the cost of capital (Hart and Ahuja, 1996; Sharfman and Fernando, 2008) . Apart from the issue that capital market data are noisy, a potential drawback of this approach is that future profitability, risk and the cost of capital cannot be examined in isolation because they are likely to be determined simultaneously.
Studies of the relationship between dividend policy decisions and CSR are scant. To our knowledge, Rakotomavo (2012) is the only paper in the literature. However, it examines a specific issue on the relationship between investment in CSR and unexpected dividends and 6 finds that CSR investments do not take away from expected dividends. This paper differs from Rakotomavo (2012) in the following ways. First, the measure of CSR that his paper uses is restrictive because it considers CSR strengths only and ignores another important dimension of CSR (i.e., weaknesses) that may also determine dividend policy in an important way. We use a measure of CSR that makes use of information on both strengths and weaknesses. Second, his measure of unexpected dividends is a model-specific measure that may be sensitive to how the model for expectation is specified and estimated. 5 Following
DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Skinner (2004) and Chay and Suh (2009) , we use the actual dividend payout ratio as a measure of dividend policy because it is a model-free measure and suffers no estimation problems. Third, his paper does not examine the issue of the propensity to pay dividends. It is our view that this issue is very important because more than half of CSR firms in our sample do not pay any dividends over time and they tend to pay no dividends persistently, resulting in the zero-inflation problem (i.e., a statistical problem associated with excess zero observations). 6 It is not clear whether this zeroinflation problem affects his findings. 7 In addition, it is noteworthy that non-dividend-paying firms choose to pay no dividends. If this decision is non-random (i.e., based on systematic factors), then analyses based only on dividend-paying firms may suffer from self-selection bias. It is therefore important to account for the relationship that may exist between the propensity to pay dividends and the dividend payment decision. The failure to control for this relationship results in a biased estimation because of the sample selection problem 5 More specifically, his expectation model is just an OLS regression of current dividends against current earnings and lagged dividends; this model is known to suffer from biased or inconsistent estimation in the presence of unobserved heterogeneity and cross-sectional dependence (Phillips and Sul, 2007) . 6 See the "Methodology" section for further information on this issue. 7 If all data are used, then these data will suffer from the over-dispersion problem because of excessive zeros. If only the data greater than zero are used in the analysis, important information about firms with zero dividends is lost, and estimates of the totals will not include zero values. When one is relying on estimates from such analyses to make dividend policy decisions, inaccurate conclusions may be made, which could lead to policies that are inadequate or inappropriate for the population of interest. (Heckman, 1979) . Fourth, after controlling for the zero-inflation problem and self-selection problem, we find that the CSR score does not affect the propensity to pay dividends but does influence the dividend payout ratio. Consistent with the finding of Rakotomavo (2012) that firms with higher CSR scores do not reduce any dividends, we find that firms with higher CSR scores tend to have a higher payout ratio.
In theory, CSR can affect dividend policy through two major channels. One is the earnings channel and the other one is the cost of equity capital channel. 8 The earnings channel depicts that CSR may affect earnings, which in turn affects dividend policy. It has been well documented in the literature that earnings are a key determinant of dividend policy (see, for example, Gul, 1999; Michaely and Roberts, 2012) . Firms with higher earnings ability are more likely to pay dividends, and if they do, they will pay more in dividends. Heal (2005) argues that CSR can enhance earnings through better relationships with stakeholders, more efficient management, better asset allocation, better labor policies and other efficiency improvements. Such benefits are expected to flow through to investors in the form of increased earnings and strong dividend policies, resulting in a win/win scenario for firms, investors and stakeholders (Statman, 2000) . Empirical studies seem to support this view. For example, good relationships with stakeholders can reduce transaction costs (Jones, 1995), enhance competitive advantage (Hillman and Keim, 2001; Choi and Wang, 2009 ) and reduce the cash flow shock when a negative event occurs (Godfrey, Merrill, and Hansen, 2009 The cost of equity capital channel argues that CSR may lower the cost of capital, which in turn encourages firms to hold cash or invest instead of paying out cash dividends. The underlying economic principle is simple and well-documented in the literature (see, for example, Kim, Mauer, and Sherman (1998)): whenever the cost of capital is lower (higher), a firm's incentive to hold cash is expected to be higher (lower) because the opportunity cost of hoarding cash is also lower (higher). A firm's incentive to invest is expected to be higher (lower) too because whenever the cost of capital is low (high), the external financial constraint is less (more) binding on firms. Thus, firms without a binding financial constraint can now accept projects that were otherwise not feasible (due to the limited supply of external finance) and/or not profitable (due to the higher cost of capital), leaving less room for paying dividends, while firms with such a constraint cannot. These two incentives could generate a crowding-out (crowding-in) effect on dividends whenever the cost of capital is low (high).
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CSR lowers the cost of capital because it can reduce the risk premium associated with the cost of capital. The risk premium is perceived to be smaller because firms with higher CSR 9 The early meta analytic evidence (i.e., up to 2002) on the link between CSR and earnings is mixed. See Orlitzky, Schmidt, Rynes (2003) . 10 For a technical discussion of the same issue in a dynamic setting, see Akyildirim, Guney, Rochet and Soner (2014) .
scores tend to be less risky and associated with better corporate governance (Harjoto and Jo, 2011) , stronger loyalty from investor or customer (Luo and Bhattacharya, 2009; Albuquerque et al., 2014; Jo and Na, 2012) , good reputation or social capital (Luo and Bhattacharya, 2009) , and/or larger investor bases with less information asymmetry problems (Ghoul et al., 2011) .
It is noteworthy that the impact of CSR on dividend policy is positive in the first channel, while it is negative in the second channel. As these two channels may coexist, the overall impact of CSR on dividend policy depends on which channel dominates. In view of this, we formulate several hypotheses for the two channels:
The earnings channel predicts the following:
H1: Among those firms that pay dividends, firms with higher CSR scores tend to pay more.
The predictions of the cost of equity capital channel are:
H2: Among those firms that pay dividends, firms with higher CSR scores tend to pay less.
Note that the literature currently does not offer if, and why, CSR may be a determinant of propensity to pay dividends. As a result, we set the following hypothesis:
H3: Other things being equal, CSR scores are not associated with propensity to pay dividends.
Empirical tests

Measurement of key variables
We use CSR measures from Kinder, Lydenberg and Domini (KLD) of 1,965 firms from 1991 to 2010. These KLD measure scores are derived from the Environmental, Social and Corporate Governance (ESG) framework of corporate social responsibility. Broadly speaking, the "E" dimension is the environment, the "S" dimension consists of three sub-dimensions (namely, community relations, human rights and product safety) while the "G" dimension covers another three sub-dimensions (corporate governance, diversity & employee relations).
Each of these seven sub-dimensions is rated yearly based on a number of positive (strength) and negative ( Following Deng et al. (2013) , we use the relative aggregation method, which is designed to minimize the potential drawbacks of the KLD data. The formula of the relative aggregation method is shown below:
where is the CSR score for dimension i at time t; is the p th strength indicator for dimension i at time t; is the q th strength indicator for dimension i at time t (both indicators are dummy variables that equal 1 if the firm meets strength p or weakness q, otherwise 0); and and are the total number of strength and weakness indicators, respectively, at time t. As both strength and weakness indicators are first summed and then averaged each year before the CSR score is computed, this procedure ensures that year-to-year comparison can be done meaningfully. Note that the CSR score so computed is easy to interpret, as by construction it lies between -1 and +1. The aggregate CSR score is just a simple average of the CSR scores of the seven dimensions.
To examine the impact of CSR on dividend policy, we look at two dimensions: the propensity to pay dividends (i.e., how likely is a firm to pay dividends?) and the dividend payout ratio we compute the dividend payout ratio (payout) as follows:
payout = dividends per share (DVPSX_F) / diluted earnings per share (EPSFX).
( 2) we use a set of control variables to capture firm characteristics that may affect dividend policy (Gul, 1999; Fama and French, 2001; Hoberg and Prabhala, 2008; Michaely and Roberts, 2012) . The details of these variables are illustrated in Appendix A.
We control for earnings for two reasons. First, firms with high profitability are more likely to pay dividends and if they do, pay more dividends French, 2001, 2002) . Thus, earnings to total assets (eta), as a proxy for earnings, is expected to be positively related to the propensity to pay dividends and the dividend payout decision. Second, recall that one of the channels through which CSR may affect dividend policy is the earnings channel. It is important to control for earnings because some known and unknown factors other than CSR could also affect dividend policy via earnings.
Retained earnings as a proportion of total assets (reta), as a proxy for the firm life cycle, is expected to be positively related to the propensity to pay, as DeAngelo et al. (2006) and Banyi and Kahle (2014) show that firms with lower reta are less likely to pay dividends, while firms with higher reta are more mature and thus more likely to pay.
Agency theory argues that dividends can provide a disciplinary mechanism to reduce and limit managerial power because it can decrease the amount of free cash flow (agency problem) and increase the incentive for managers to put funds into profitable investments (Jensen, 1986) . However, other mechanisms are available to serve a similar purpose and they include investment opportunities (measured by the market-to-book ratio) and debt (measured by leverage). Whether these mechanisms are complementary or substitutes depends on the relative costs of these mechanisms. For example, if interest rates are low (high), firms find many investment opportunities profitable (not profitable) and firms with more (less) investment opportunities tend to retain more (less) of their earnings to finance new investments (Myers, 1984) . This line of reasoning suggests that the relationship between dividends and investment opportunities can be positive or negative. Similarly, firms also find it relatively easy (difficult) to raise more money in the form of debt financing and pay more dividends in a low (high) interest rate environment. It is not unreasonable to see that leverage and dividend payouts are both positively (negatively) correlated in such a low (high) interest rate environment. However, for those high-leverage firms, their financial risk is expected to be higher and so is their interest burden, suggesting that these firms find it luxurious to pay dividends. Thus, leverage is expected to be negatively related to the propensity to pay.
The cost of equity capital (r_com) is used as a control variable because it is a channel through which CSR may affect dividend policy. As discussed in the "Hypothesis development"
section, a lower cost of capital can encourage firms to hold cash or invest instead of paying out cash dividends. Therefore, the cost of capital is expected to be positively related to the dividend payout decision. We employ a recently developed method proposed by Hou, Van
Dijk and Zhang (2012) to compute the cost of equity capital.
Data and Sample Selection
We obtain the data required for this study from Compustat and match it with the KLD data.
The initial sample consists of all firm-year observations spanning the period 1991-2010.
After excluding financial firms (SIC codes 6000-6999) and utilities (SIC codes 4400-4999), the sample is further filtered with the requirements that all firms to be included must have no negative or zero book assets, and no missing values for the key variables. 11 To reduce the influence of outliers, we winsorize 1% of the sample on both sides. The final sample is an unbalanced panel data that consists of 15,561 firm-year observations. There are 1,965 firms in the sample with an average number of years being approximately six. Figure 1 shows that the data for the dividend payout ratio are right-skewed, involving a substantial proportion of zero values because many firms do not pay dividends. This gives rise to a statistical or econometric problem called the zero-inflation problem. Analyzing zero-inflated data as though they were normal may lead to biased or inconsistent estimates, inflated standard errors and inappropriate inference because the data are often skewed, heteroskedastic and over-dispersed (see Min and Agresti, 2002 for a survey). In addition, non-dividend-paying firms are quite persistent over time. Once they do not pay dividends, the chance of these firms continuing not to pay dividends is very high, as shown by Table 2 where the transition probability of dividend-paying firms (i.e., payer) and non-dividendpaying firms (i.e., nonpayer) are shown. The transition probability of the status quo of nondividend-paying firms is 91.83%, while that of dividend-paying firms is 92.61%, confirming that they are quite distinct groups of firms. This begs the question of whether the decision to pay or not to pay dividends (i.e., the propensity to pay dividends) should be modeled separately from the decision of what dividends to pay (i.e., the dividend payout decision). If the former decision is not random and affects the latter decision, then to estimate the latter decision based on those firms that pay dividends may suffer from the sample selection problem or self-selection problem (Heckman, 1979) .
Methodology
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To deal with both the zero-inflation problem and the sample selection problem, we use a standard Heckman sample selection model 14 that breaks down the dividend policy into two sub-decisions and models them separately. The first one is the decision to pay or not to pay dividends (i.e., the propensity to pay decision) and the second one is the decision to determine the amount of dividends (i.e., the dividend payment decision). Specifically, the model handles zeros and positive values separately through two equations: the selection equation for the probability of paying dividends (i.e., Y > 0) and the main equation for the strictly positive value of the dividend payment conditional on its payment (i.e., Y| Y > 0). We also allow for the possibility that these two decisions are related to each other; they are then linked together by imposing a correlation structure on the error terms that appear in the two equations. Heckman (1979) points out that the failure to account for the correlation between these two equations is susceptible to inconsistent estimation due to the sample selection problem. Please see the detail in Appendix B.
Empirical results
Figure 2 plots the evolution of the annual average of the dividend payout ratio and the CSR score over time. French (2001, 2002) After that, it remains in negative territory until 2010. It is not difficult to see that the annual averages of these two variables generally move in line with each other, suggesting that they are correlated. Table 3 shows the summary statistics of the key variables. Owing to the zero-inflation problem, the dividend payout ratio (payout) suffers from over-dispersion, meaning that its sample variance (25.4%) is much larger than its sample mean (15.2%). Over-dispersion implies that the empirical density is skewed with most of the probability for low values of the variable being larger than that for high values. The average sample firm is characterized as a firm of medium size (nysep  49.1%), with some growth opportunities (mtb > 2) and earnings power (eta 6%) but with a reasonable amount of retained earnings (reta = 12%) and large cash holdings (cash  15.8%), low leverage (lev < 22%), average systematic risk (beta  1) and high idiosyncratic risk (idio = 2.353). The CSR score of the average sample firm is a little bit below zero (i.e., -0.013).
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 4 show the parameter estimates of the standard two-step estimation method for the Heckman sample selection model where the dependent variable is (the log of) dividends payouts. The coefficient of the inverse Mills ratio is 0.740 and statistically significant at conventional levels. This finding suggests the presence of sample selection bias.
It is noteworthy that CSR does not affect the propensity to pay dividends but does influence the dividend payout ratio because the coefficient of CSR is 0.194 and not statistically significant in the selection (the propensity to pay) equation, while it is 0.237 and statistically significant at conventional levels in the main (dividend payout) equation. In other words, CSR is a driver of the dividend payout ratio but not of the propensity to pay because firms with high CSR scores are as likely to pay dividends as those with low CSR scores. Among those firms that pay dividends, firms with high CSR scores tend to pay more dividends out of their earnings. In particular, a 0.1 unit increase in the CSR score will give rise to a 2.37%
increase in the log of the dividend payout ratio. This is equivalent to a 2.398% (=(exp(0.237)*0.1 -1)*100%) increase in the dividend payout ratio, suggesting that the corresponding change is highly economically significant.
15
Consistent with the findings of Gul (1999) , DeAngelo et al. (2006) and Hoberg and Prabhala (2008) , the selection equation results indicate that the propensity to pay is positively related to earnings (eta), firm life cycle (reta), firm size (nysep) and whether the firm was a dividend-payer in the previous year (payer), but negatively related to the leverage ratio (lev), cash holdings (cash), risks (beta and idio) and the cost of capital (r_com). In other words, mature firms with good earnings power, large market capitalization and a track record of paying dividends are more likely to pay dividends, while firms with a high level of cash balances, debt, risks and financing cost are more likely not to pay. We use as an exclusion restriction three variables recently proposed by Banyi and Kahle (2014) as new determinants of the propensity to pay. They are the decade in which a firm goes IPO (ipo90), its interaction with firm life cycle (reta*ipo90) and tax regime during which there is a dividend tax cut (taxregime); they are all statistically significant at conventional levels.
Among those firms that pay dividends, the main equation results show that firms that tend to have a low dividend payout ratio are mature and large firms with little earnings and cash, but with a high level of risks and stock buyback activities. Interestingly, dividend-paying firms with a high level of debt and cost of capital also tend to pay more dividends out of their earnings probably because of the low interest rate environment prevailing in the sample period.
It is interesting to note that most of all control variables are statistically significant and some of their coefficients are of different signs in the two equations of the model. This finding suggests that these control variables play different roles in determining the propensity to pay dividends and the dividend payout ratio, respectively. These variables include firm size, leverage, the cost of capital, cash and retained earnings.
Robustness Checks
FIML estimates of the Heckman sample selection model
The two-step estimator is consistent but not asymptotically efficient. The FIML estimation can provide efficient estimates. In view of this, we report the FIML estimates in Columns (3) and (4) The FIML results also show that csr does not affect the selection (the propensity to pay) equation but does influence the main (dividend payout) equation. A 0.1 unit increase in csr is associated with a 13.08% increase in the dividend payout ratio.
Joint Normality of the Error Terms
Zuehlke and Zeman (1991) Table 5 . Table 3 , where the coefficient of the inverse Mills ratio is statistically significant, Table 5 shows that the error terms of the main equation and the selection equation are not independent, as the Wald test statistic (47.553 and statistically significant) rejects the null hypothesis that they are independent of each other. The coefficient of the inverse Mills ratio is 1.339 and statistically significant, confirming the presence of the sample selection problem. As in Table 3 , the coefficient of csr is positive in both the main equation and the selection equation but it is only statistically significant in the former. This evidence is important in the following sense. First, it suggests that our main findings still hold even though the joint normality assumption is relaxed. Second, the dependence structure of the error terms seems to be an asymmetric one because dependence is stronger in the upper tail but not in the lower tail; any positive shock in the selection equation can give rise to a similar shock in the main equation but a negative shock does not have a similar effect.
Consistent with
Endogenous CSR and alternative explanation
We also explore the robustness of our findings by examining some endogeneity issues with the Heckman sample selection model. This model employs a restrictive assumption that the explanatory variables are exogenous in the sense that they are independent of the error terms, ruling out any endogeneity problems that may exist in the model. In other words, some unobserved variables are omitted from the model but they drive the explanatory variables to be correlated with the error terms in the model. For example, agency problems, which are not directly observable, may drive both csr and dividend policy move together.
The agency view of CSR predicts that CSR activities can be used by executives to extract their private benefits and/or to pursue their own interests (Surroca and Tribo, 2008; Jiraporn and Chintrakarn, 2013; Fabrizi, Mallin, and Michelon, 2014) Schwiebert (2015) . In particular, we apply the FIML estimation approach, which simultaneously estimates the parameters of the selection equation, the main equation and an additional equation called the first-stage regression, where the regression of csr on all exogenous variables is estimated. 18 The advantage of this procedure is that it can deal with the sample selection problem and the endogeneity problem in both the equations together.
Following Deng et al. (2013) (Deng et al., 2013; Di Giuli and Kostovetsky, 2014) and it is unlikely to have a significant effect on the firm's dividend policy. Di Giuli and Kostovetsky (2014) argue that "political affiliation is a natural measure of preferences for social responsibility. The
Democratic Party platform places more emphasis on CSR-related issues such as environmental protection, anti-discrimination laws and affirmative action, employee protection, and helping the poor and disadvantaged" (p.159) and report evidence that csr scores are associated with the political affiliation of external stakeholders of firms (measured by voting patterns in the state where the firm is headquartered). In particular, Democratic-leaning firms are more socially responsible than Republican-leaning firms in the sense that they spend more on CSR.
To construct the instrument, we first extract data on a firm's headquarters address from its annual reports (i.e., 10-K and related reports) on SEC's Edgar website and find out the state in which the firm's headquarters is/was located. We then match the state with the list of blue or red states developed from the electoral results available at the US Electoral College's website and identify whether that state is a blue or red state in a particular year.
The estimation results are reported in Table 6 . After controlling for endogeneity, Table 6 shows a similar result to Table 4 . Column (3) of (2015) paper. Since eps is significant in both equations, this indicates that the endogeneity of csr is indeed present.
Consistent with our main findings, Column (2) shows that csr cannot explain the propensity to pay in the selection equation because its coefficient is -5.952 and statistically insignificant.
Column (1) shows that the coefficient of csr (i.e., 8.887) in the main equation (i.e., the dividend payout decision) is positive and also statistically significant, meaning that firms with higher CSR scores tend to have a higher dividend payout ratio. In particular, if csr is increased by 0.01 units, the dividend payout ratio increases by 9.294% (=exp(8.887*0.01)-1)*100%).
Reverse causality
Reverse causality is a potential source of endogeneity. One may argue that it is dividend policy which affects csr because csr, especially when viewed as a kind of investment, is constrained by the amount of cash available for investment purpose. Given the fact that dividend policy is sticky, the amount of dividends payable may restrict the amount of money 19 Staiger and Stock (1997) and Stock and Yogo (2005) available for investment/engagement in CSR activities. We check for this possibility and find that the coefficient of dividend payout is not statistically significant in a regression where csr is specified as the dependent variable. 
Alternative Measure of CSR
We also check for the robustness of our findings by using an alternative measure of csr called csr1. In line with Rakotomavo (2012), we re-estimate the model by using CSR strengths only as an alternative measure of CSR and find that all the regression coefficients are of the same signs and similar magnitudes as in Table 4 and the coefficient of csr1 is still statistically significant at conventional levels in the main equation only. 
Alternative Measure of Dividend Policy
Recall that our proxy for dividend policy is dividends paid divided by diluted earnings per share. One may question whether this proxy may be mechanically related to the firm's CSR activities via the earnings channel (i.e., the denominator term of our proxy). We use an alternative proxy of dividend policy instead. This alternative proxy defines dividend policy as the ratio of cash dividends on common stocks to net sales and has been used in many papers (e.g., La Porta et al, 2000; Brockman and Unlu, 2009; Chay and Suh, 2009) . We find that with this alternative measure, the main results remain very much the same. 
Which CSR sub-dimension(s) matters?
20 Results are available upon request. 21 Results are available upon request. 22 Though not reported here, we also use the ratio of cash dividends on common stocks to total assets as another proxy for dividend policy. The results are similar and available upon request.
Note that our CSR measure is an aggregate measure that captures only the overall (average) performance of a firm on seven CSR sub-dimensions. They are community relations, human rights, product safety, corporate governance, diversity, employee relations and the environment. It is interesting to know which of them affect dividend policy. Table 7 shows that out of these seven sub-dimensions, only five of them can explain dividend payout decision because their coefficients are statistically significant at the conventional levels. 23 These seven sub-dimensions suffer no serious multicollinearity problem as their correlations are typically less than 0.25 and their variance inflation factor are low (i.e., less than 10). 24 Note that corporate governance and diversity also affect propensity to pay dividends as well. This result is consistent with one of the main findings that csr does not affect propensity to pay dividends because the impact of corporate governance and diversity are similar in magnitude but opposite in direction, making the net effect of csr upon propensity to pay dividends not different from zero in statistical sense.
Conclusions
In this paper, we investigate whether CSR affects firms' dividend policy. Two competing views are identified and they have different predictions on the relation between CSR and dividend policy. "The earnings channel" predicts a positive relation because CSR activities can enhance income, putting firms in a better position to pay (higher) dividends. "The cost of equity capital channel" depicts a negative relation because CSR activities can lower the cost of equity capital, which in turns provides incentives for firms to invest or hoard cash rather than to pay dividends.
By using a panel dataset of 1,945 US listed firms from 1991 to 2010, we find that there is no significant relationship between CSR and the propensity to pay dividends. However, firms with higher CSR scores tend to have a higher dividend payout ratio. 
where is a vector of the parameters and denotes the error term. The dependent variable is related to as follows:
where is a vector of the parameters and denotes the error term.
If and are correlated, the OLS estimation of the main equation using only the observations with 1 leads to sample selection bias. This is because
where is a parameter and
is known as the inverse Mills ratio term. Equation (3) shows that estimating the main equation by using only observations with 1 induces an omitted variable bias problem, as the inverse Mills ratio might be correlated with the explanatory variables .
In order to get consistent estimates, one may estimate the main equation by OLS using only observations with 1, but the set of covariates must include not only but also the inverse Mills ratio term .
In the presence of the sample selection problem, Heckman (1979) proposes full information maximum likelihood (FIML) and two-step estimators, assuming that the errors in the selection and main equations are jointly normally distributed. These assumptions are theoretically sufficient for identification by exploiting the nonlinearity of the selection bias correction term (i.e., inverse Mills ratio). If the same set of explanatory variables (i.e., X 1 = X 2 )
is used in both the main and the selection equations, this means that X 1 (or X 2 ) can affect Y 1 directly and indirectly via  in equation (3), making the estimation of equation (3) more susceptible to the multicollinearity problem. To avoid the potential multicollinearity problem, we apply the exclusion restriction that requires the set of variables for X 1 to be a subset of that for X 2 . More specifically, we include in the set of X 2 (or equivalently, in the selection equation) three additional variables (ipo90, an interaction variable between reta and ipo90 and taxregime) recently proposed by Banyi and Kahle (2014) as new determinants of the propensity to pay. They report evidence that those firms (especially those young firms) who went IPO after 1990 tend to have a lower propensity to pay dividends and that the propensity to pay is also lower in tax regimes where there are dividend tax cuts. Appendix B) . Two estimation methods are used and they are two-step estimation (Columns (1) and (2)) and full information maximum likelihood (FIML) estimation (Columns (3) and (4)). For variable definitions see Appendix A. Standard errors are reported in parentheses; *, ** and *** represent significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent level, respectively. ^ Robust standard errors are reported for FIML estimates only. Table 4 where there are two equations called main equation and selection equation, respectively. The dependent variable In the main (selection) equation is dividend payout ratio (propensity to pay dividends) (see Appendix B). Full information maximum likelihood (FIML) estimation is used and the estimation results are shown in Columns (1) and (2). For variable definitions see Appendix A. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses; *, ** and *** represent significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent level, respectively. (1) and (2). Column (3) shows the first stage regression results. For variable definitions see Appendix A. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses; *, ** and *** represent significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent level, respectively. Dividend payout ratio vs CSR
